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Ethnicity Meets Gender Meets Class in Australia

Feminism in A ustralia is a political m ovem ent and a published
discourse. Its activities range from Equal Employment Opportunity
practices in the public service to 'cultural' production in such forms
as academic literature and docum entary film-making. For most
im m igrant w om en of non-English speaking background, the
cultural arena of feminism is foreign, in many more ways than one.
Feminism represents, to speak perhaps too stereo typically, a middle
class 'Anglo' culture, far removed from everyday experience. And
this despite well-meaning concern on the part of many feminists for
those groups suffering compound oppressions of class and ethnicity,
as well as gender. Symbolically, an almost cult concern is shown for
the plight of the migrant woman outworker, and with considerable
real justification. Yet this concern is from a singular cultural
perspective: middle class libertarian liberalism, quite alien to the
immediate needs and aspirations of its subjects.
Indeed, many non-English speaking background migrant women
have gone through revolutionary transitions much greater, and
freq u en tly dem anding m uch m ore p erso n al courage and
determination, than the careers and life-projects of the leaders of the
EEO industry or the feminist film makers on their government
grants. Whilst not speaking feminism, the language of criticism and
re-assertion of power, the practical struggles of many immigrant
women are akin in critical spirit and outcome to feminism itself.
Rather contradictorily, perhaps, this often involves a dramatic self
transform ation, assuming some elem ents of the radically new
culture of industrialism , whilst retaining what is powerful and
positively human in traditional women’s culture. And, as often as
not it also involves failure, isolation and oppression, as racism meets
sexism and class immobility with a peculiar vengeance.
In recent years, the cultural gap between the feminist movement and
non-English speaking background immigrant women in Australia
has closed somewhat but their encounters are still problematic. To
.cite one instance, Franca Arena, a Labor member o f the New South
W ales Legislative Council (or Upper House) and Australia's first
wom an parliam entarian o f non-English speaking im m igrant
background, has set up an 'Ethnic Women's Network' which meets
regularly in Sydney's Parliament House and which has developed

significant political clout. Franca's stated goal for the network is to
provide an arena for women of non-English speaking background to
meet with the members - and the procedures - of government on its
own turf in order to demystify that institution. It has proved to be a
very successful exercise in constructing a constituency, in giving
w om en o f non-English speaking background direct access to
governm ent M inisters and heads of Governmental authorities, and
in giving them entry into the magical mystery tour o f the state. Yet
the exercise is fraught with contradictions and tensions, primarily
because, for many of these w om en, participating in such an
experience is more significant for their being brought into the
m ainstream than as an expression of their 'ethnic' difference. The
'privileged' nature of this encounter is reinforced at every meeting
when the grey suited men, guarding Parliam ent from the likes of
ordinary people, especially 'accented' women, delay the participants
unnecessarily with the etiquette of protecting the institution.
The positions held by the women in these gatherings and the shifts
they are undergoing in their lives, are neither clear-cut nor parallel.
They are em blem atic how ever, o f the as yet unspoken divide
betw een non-English speaking background immigrant wom en and
m ainstream 'A nglo' fem inists. F or exam ple, one of the first
meetings of the group was addressed by a key feminist activist now
working within state structures in the service o f her sisters. At great
length, and in passionate terms, she described how important it was
for her to defy patriarchal bonds, to break out of the straight jacket
of C atholicism into which she had been socialised through an
education at the hands of nuns, to leave behind traditional Irish
values of fam ily and w om anhood and to choose to be a single
independent person. And this to an audience of non-English
speaking women which included Muslim women in Purdah who had
come along to this meeting to ask for support to change their work
practices in order to allow them their traditional prayer sessions;
and mothers who wanted their children to be taught their mother
tongue and cultural traditions within the state school system.
On the other hand, there have been sessions where middle-class
women activists from South American background have bemoaned
that Australian women's organizations are politically backward and
that A ustralian political life is generally suffocated by macho
'Anglo' ockerism, epitiomised by the array of government ministers
invited to address the meetings. The 'Anglo' femocrats who turn up,
accom panying these men, sit quietly at the back and groan at the
sight - with these men who will never learn and with these women
who are 'unreal'. They know they have no voice to speak - to preach
to the non-English speaking background women in such a setting,
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but they are secure in their power back in the offices, as minders of
ministers and minions of the state.
This chapter attem pts to address those m ost difficult social
questions, those that arise when class, gender and ethnicity meet. Of
course, class, gender and ethnicity are always meeting, but they only
appear as a 'problem' for groups where the process o f intersection
portends inequality and m arginalisation. This is precisely what
makes this topic so difficult. It is really about huge historical and
social questions which m ainstream social analysis conveniently
ignores. For example, the points at which middle class culture meets
m ale culture m eets 'A nglo' culture, social science im plicitly
co n sid ers norm al or n atu ral or an irre lev a n t b ackdrop.
Furthermore, if we are really concerned with social relations and
not cultural pathology, any discussion of immigrant women throws
into question the enormous com plexity of the relationships o f a
whole finely stratified or segmented society. The woman question is
sim ultaneously the man question. The 'ethnicity' question is
simultaneously the dominant culture question. And the question of
each fine permutation of class simultaneously implicates the unholy
synergy of class relations.
So we have, on the one hand, a feminism which is culturally distant
from those of its subjects whose lives are peculiarly difficult, and on
the other, a series of fundam ental social questions w hich are
enorm ous in their scope and com plexity. It is hardly surprising,
then, that the literature in this area is fragmentary and as yet poorly
developed. The following is one early contribution, a high speed
chase through some of the issues. The first section discusses the
social background; post-war migration to Australia and the place of
women immigrants in Australian society. The second discusses the
concepts of ethnicity, class and gender, then the process of
decentring or fragm entation of everyday life and identity which
accompanies the migration process with a peculiar intensity. Finally,
taking up the question of political ways forward, the role of the state
is analysed, both in the context of women's rights issues and the
developm ent of multiculturalism , which are certainly not always
complementary and simply progressive moves.
Women and Post-War Immigration
A ustralia's post-w ar imm igration, in w orld-historical terms, has
been quite extraordinary. Only Israel has experienced more
immigration over the same period relative to the size of the existing
population, but in quite an unusual set of historical circumstances. In
sheer statistical terms, the post-w ar A ustralian experience even
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exceeds the great tide of immigration to the USA in the early years
of the twentieth century. More than three million immigrants have
arrived since the migration program began in earnest in 1947. The
population has increased from under eight m illion to over sixteen
million. One person in three is an im m igrant or the child o f an
immigrant. During the post-w ar boom, A ustralia had the highest
rates of population and workforce growth of any OECD country,
with immigrants filling 61.2% of the additional jobs between 1947
and 1972.
Labour market position is one starting point for situating immigrant
women in a sociological context. In 1947 only 12 percent of the
Australian workforce had been bom overseas, 70 percent of whom
were of British origin. 22 percent o f the workforce were women.
By 1976, 26 percent of the w orkforce w ere born overseas,
representing an immigrant population only forty percent of whom
were British-born. 36 percent of the workforce is now women. In
other words, there has been a significant shift in the labour force,
with substantial relative increases in the participation of women,
imm igrants and non-English speakers. Perhaps the m ost dramatic
change is the increased number of married women in the workforce,
from 15 percent of the female workforce in 1947 to 61 percent in
1979.1
Over the decades, the composition of this immigrant population has
becom e increasingly diversified. W hen the mass im m igration
program began, there w as a strong em phasis on B ritish
im m igration. A rthur C alw ell, the L abour politician who was
A ustralia's first M inister of Immigration, gave the assurance that
for every foreign migrant there will be ten people from the United
Kingdom: Or at least, those foreigners who were allowed in were to
be 'assim ilable types' such as the Dutch. H ow ever, the racist
direction of immigration policy and the project of assimilating those
who were different was to prove unworkable in the long term. In
fact, even in the short term, the imm igration quota of one percent
population increase per annum could only be met by bringing in
refugees from war-torn Central and Eastern Europe. Recruitm ent
was soon to extend to Southern Europe, and by time of the European
econom ic 'm iracle' of the late sixties and early seventies, when
European sources of immigration were running dry, to Turkey and
the Middle East. By the 1980s, the net had spread even further afield
with substantial immigration from South East A sia and Central and
South America.
By the 1980s, 25.8 percent of Australian women aged 20-64 had
been bom overseas. Splitting this figure by origins, 11.4 percent of
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A ustralian women were born in non-English speaking countries
other than Australia: 2.3 percent in Northwest Europe, 1.5 percent
in Eastern Europe, 7.7 percent in the M editerranean region, and 3.0
percent in Third World countries, particularly South East Asia and
Central and South Am erica.2
How do those various groups, as defined by immigrant, or non
im m igrant background and gender, fare in A ustralian society?
Employm ent is a central m arker of social class and social status.
Several key writers have thus taken the labour m arket as a basepoint from which to measure the experience of different groups.
C ollins divides the A ustralian labour m arket into four m ajor
segments. The first consists of A ustralian-born and Anglophone
male migrants who earn the highest pay and who are employed in
the tertiary sector or in skilled jobs in the m anufacturing sector.
T hey h av e c le a rly d efin e d c a re e r stru c tu re s and are
disproportionately represented in pow er structures, such as the
trade unions and politics. The second segment, of non-Anglophone
migrant males, is located mainly in semi-skilled and unskilled jobs in
m anufacturing and construction. This is the 'factory fodder' of
industry, frequently poorly paid, in exhausting and dirty jobs and
with very low participation in pow er structures and little hope of
career advancem ent. The third segm ent is A ustralian-born or
Anglophone im m igrant women, who are paid less than first or
second segm ent men and tend to w ork in traditional areas of
women's em ployment in the tertiary sector. In a fourth segment,
w om en im m ig ran ts from n o n -A n g lo p h o n e c o u n trie s are
concentrated in the parts of the manufacturing sector hardest hit by
economic restructuring. Their pay is lowest and working conditions
poorest, frequently being involved in piecework or outwork.3 To
this categorisation De Lepervanche adds fifth and sixth segments of
A boriginal men and w om en respectively, many o f whom are
marginalised to permanently unemployed, fringe dweller status.^
These generalisations are only the beginning of an analysis of the
place of im m igrant women. Indeed, w hilst containing a basic
elem ent o f truth, they are crude over-sim plifications. W ithin
C ollin's third segm ent, there is considerable differentiation
according to background. M editerranean women hold jobs of much
lower status and which pay more poorly than Northwest Europeans,
East Europeans and South East Asian W o m e n . 5 This is very much
linked to class background in the country of origin and level of
education. M editerranean women work in the worst jobs in the
industrial workforce, and are those m ost vulnerable in the current
economic restructuring. They suffer severe occupational health and
safety problems such as repetitive strain injuries, low levels of
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English language proficiency, and lack of support from male and
'Anglo'-dom inated unions.6
Even this subdivision of a labour m arket segment is confounded by
com plexity, how ever, as each cultural subgroup o f im m igrant
women is by no means homogeneous in class terms. Reworking
1981 census statistics, Evans concludes that betw een 9 and 14
percent of employed Australian women of all backgrounds own
th e ir ow n b u sin e sse s w ith w om en o f T h ird W orld and
M editerranean origin being more likely to be entrepreneurs than
other groups.7 This reflects significant class differentiation within
even a seriously disadvantaged subgroup such as M editerranean
women, and some genuine and impressive stories of upward social
m obility. It also reflects official statistics in w hich outworkers are
categorised as self-em ployed. Self-em ploym ent, furtherm ore,
includes fam ily-run shops and m ilk bars in w hich w orking
conditions and rates of return are sometimes as bad as the worst of
industrial jobs. And, as Collins points out, the proportion selfem ployed in imm igrant groups has dropped dram atically in the
structural econom ic re-adjustm ents of the post-w ar decades, as
superm arkets, for exam ple, eclipse the corner store.8 There is
evidence, however, of growth in some form s of 'self-employment'
such as outw ork in the clothing industry. This leaves us with
com plex and contradictory subdifferentiation which does not deny
the general thrust of overall descriptions o f labour m arket
segm entation, but w hich serves as a w arning against sim plistic
arguments about any necessary outcomes in the overlay of gender,
class and ethnicity.
The m atter is com plicated still further by generational differences.
C ontrary to conventional w isdom s about the relation of labour
m igration to the self-perpetuating phenomenon of social class, there
is evidence of significant intergenerational m obility. The above
discussion was about first generation workers. W hat happens to
second generation children?
Neo-conservative critics of multiculturalism have recently began to
argue that specialist education and welfare servicing is unnecessary
because people of non-English speaking background are doing well.
The first generation, it is admitted, pays a price and is relatively
immobile, but this is supposedly compensated by significant second
generation upw ard m obility, prim arily the result o f education.
W illiams argues that a strong family and cultural 'preference' for
education produces high levels of participation in education on the
part of non-English speaking background children.9 Birrell speaks
of family support and ethnic valuing of education which produces
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upward mobility. 'They have been competing with Australians who
have generally lacked the same intensity of parented support or
pro tectio n from d istractin g influences, notably peer youth
culture.'10 In the same vein, Bullivant writes of the 'migrant drive'
and the 'ethnic work ethic'. The 'Anglo' w orking class are by
com parison, 'the new self-deprived'. 11 And indeed, those groups
which in a first generation fare so badly on the labour market, seem
to be catching up through the education system in the second.
Southern European background students, for example, achieve
greater representation in higher education than the Australian norm.
But this inter-generational differentiation m ust itself be finely
differentiated. Relative educational advantage or disadvantage is
distributed unevenly betw een ethnic groups, w ith some more
recently arrived groups faring particularly badly. G eneralisation
about the educational performance of ethnic groups also ignores the
fact that they are themselves deeply divided socio-economically and
by school performance: even if one small stratum appears to be
succeeding the m ajority is not. M oreover, by com parison with
aspirations that accompany the personal or family am bition and
'self-selection' in the migration process, the results are poor. And
these mobility problems are in all probability temporary as the post
w ar boom becomes a distant memory and the welfare state is rolled
back. 12
Situating non-English speaking background girls into this already
contradictory and m ultifaceted situation, there is considerable
evidence that their odds of success through education are longer than
their male counterparts. W hilst retention-rates are higher in the
secondary school than those of their English speaking background
peers, their aspirations and performance are lower than both their
m ale non-English speaking background counterparts and their
female peers in general. In some cases, schooling for a girl is valued
highly but only because it enhances her prestige and manageability,
rather than because it lays a foundation for career choices and
alternative futures. Girls are also placed in a particularly difficult
context of culture clash in which wildly contradictory pressures all
collide: their parents' high educational expectations; their exposure
to the liberal culture of romance, self-determ ination and official
non-sexist norms; the traditional role-model of a 'good' mother and
wife; and m ainstream sexism and racism which make the traditional
role seem a comfortable and familiar retreat. 13
W hen E th n icity M eets G en d e r an d C lass
Class, gender and ethnicity overlay each other in social reality in an
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extraordinarily complex profusion of ways. Having described some
of these in the Australian context, we will now take one step back to
discuss the key terms of theory and analysis. In recent decades, the
litany of concepts class-gender-ethnicity has em erged as a way of
accounting for lines of social inequality. It is ju st no longer
fashionable to say that class is, in the last analysis, all. Nor does it
seem that society can be reduced, in essence, to two fundamental
classes. Yet, despite the fashionable, comfortable and unquestionable
good sense behind the litany, it is too glib. It is just a reassurance of
good faith, in deference to new types of politics. The real and
nagging dem ands for recognition o f these new politics have
translated themselves into a new and often poorly thought-through
conventional wisdom: that class, gender and ethnicity (or race) are
the key lines of social inequality, the big three, and each oppression
compounds the other, formula-like. I want to argue, instead, that the
three categories do not sit together as descriptions of social realities
which are comparable or even of the same order.
'Culture' or 'ethnicity' is perhaps the most difficult and problematic
o f the three, partly because it is such a vague term. 'Culture', for
example, varies in meaning from cultural anthroplogy's holism (a
whole way of life, including material artefacts, kinship structures
and the social arrangements of subsistence) to the much narrower
co n n o tatio n s o f 'high' or 'folk' culture. 14 The culture of
'm ulticulturalism ', loosely synonym ous w ith ethnicity in social
policy and social analysis in Australia, is firmly within the narrower
connotation of folk culture. In this respect it is frequently a
politically and ideologically skewed term and in many important
respects of lim ited use. Certainly ethnicity is a powerful social
reality, and racism , m isreading surface appearances as social
causes, even more powerful. Yet the concept of ethnicity - culture as
delim ited in the m ulticulturalism of state policy - is still deeply
problematic.
The salespeople of the multicultural industry often use fruit salad,
not even with a quiver of self-mockery or a sense of fatuousness, as a
m etaphor for Australian society. Australia is a cultural-linguistic
fruit salad bowl, with the bowl as the pluralist, open, liberal
democratic state, and folk cultures with their 'community' languages
floating freely about like little slices of fruit, happy to be ingredients
in the great cuisine of modernity, yet maintaining their distinctive
flavours in tolerant harmony.
The metaphor is not just fatuous, it is ironically symbolic of the fact
that food is one of the main elements of the construction 'ethnicity'.
In schools and the media, for example, the iconography of the
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multicultural is exotic food, clothing and dance. Difference is the
message but only those colourful manifestations of difference that
we can celebrate and appreciate for their colour. But, how ever
much their middle class clients m ight enjoy eating out at ethnic
restaurants in the cosmopolitan city, 'ethnic' restaurants frequently
involve working conditions for family members which are far from
attractive. Despite the appearance of difference, the structural
reality of food in industrial society is as a commodity in a money
economy. Behind the food there is another world.
To stay with food for a moment, a woman of rural Lebanese
immigrant background walks into a shop and buys Lebanese bread
just one in the colourful cacophony of breads. The multicultural city
is in action. But the woman works in a factory for a wage (abstract
labour and not direct subsistence). She has separate realms of work
and domesticity, the week and the weekend (rather than the work
and the fam iliar being integrated in traditional rural forms of
farming). She is housed in suburbia for which she has to pay rent or
a mortgage (and not subsist on land). She has to be a consumer,
bank, and negotiate the welfare and education systems - all forms of
culture (in the other broad anthropological sense) essential to social
reproduction but totally new and alien to her. Even if she were to
work in a fam ily restaurant, m aintaining some rem nants of
traditional work forms, the transition through migration into the
world of full-blown commodity exchange is dramatic. There is not
much multicultural about this. The culture of multiculturalism is not
even all that relevant.
The fetish for difference not only often leads to a superficial and
apolitical reading of culture, it is also unreflectively conservative.
Preserving communities or folk cultures for posterity as museumpieces is not simply positive - as if we have to maintain a sort of
cultural national estate. In fact one of the great ironies for the
liberalism that cham pions ethnic preservation and cultural
pluralism , is the illiberal, indeed frequently racist and sexist
identifications which as much as anything else give cultures an air of
folk primordiality. Com munities certainly resist assimilation and
articulate their grievances through ethnic identifications and this is
frequently progressive. But minority identifications are a two edged
sword, particularly for women. 'Be careful who you marry. Good
girls traditionally behave in particular ways. They don't marry
loose A ustralians'. In any event, the battle to preserve ethnicity,
very much an interest for certain generations of imm igrants and
particularly for male 'community leaders', may well be a losing one.
Communities and cultures are mixed, contradictory and conflictridden things. They are certainly not clearly defined and socially
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self-isolating. Apart from the question of whether preservation is a
good thing or not, it may not even always be possible.
Behind the trivialised and conservative view of culture is a dual
hidden agenda of assimilation/marginalisation. If we talk less about
survival strategies and more about the colourful m anifestations of
pluralism , we can conveniently neglect some of the elem entary
issues o f social w elfare. So, for exam ple, a sm attering of
'community' languages is presented in schools in a poorly funded
and fragm entary way as a token of our m ulticulturalism , without
taking effective pedagogy as m easured in social outcomes, very
seriously. B ehind the colourful differences and despite the
ideological facade of multiculturalism, immigrants are assimilated,
ruthlessly but inevitably, into the system: wages-housing-welfarelaw. But it is often a marginalised assimilation with relative lack of
power and economic autonomy.
The domain of multiculturalism is not only the traditional and the
exotic. It is also, in com monsense parlance, the dom ain o f nonEnglish speaking immigrants, or the 'ethnics' in current pejorative
usage. Surely Elton John, Kentucky Fried and Eyewitness News are
not culture for the purposes of multiculturalism. The multiculturalpluralist reading of Australian society reconstructs the dominant
group as 'Anglo-celtic', an extraordinary cultural hybrid. A t this
point, however, relations of dominance are conceived to be matters
of intercultural m isunderstanding rather than structural relations,
with the dom inant culture distinguishing itself through Yorkshire
pudding and Irish ditties, or perhaps meat pies and beer advertising
jingles.
None of this discussion is intended to give the im pression that
ethnicity is not important. Ethnicity is one o f the great social issues
of our time. The discussion is only to unravel some aspects of its
politics and usages. In short, multiculturalism is used to construct a
happy ideology of pluralism to the neglect o f w ider structural
relations. The powerful reality of ethnicity, however, is that in spite
of the m odernist theories and social policies of the melting pot or
assimilation, there has been a visible and enduring effect of mass
migration. Differences have survived the move, more or less and
for better or for worse But industrialism limits the space inhabited
by these differences, to the weekend more than the week, to leisure
more than work, to the dom estic m ore than the public arena.
T heories of social structure tend to ignore this, presum ably
irrelevant, space. Theories of ethnicity tend to neglect the way in
which social structure defines and delimits this space. And then there
is racism, which links structure and culture/ethnicity, reconstructing
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the appearances of difference, both cultural and phenotypical, as a
root cause of structural inequality.
W estern industrial society, as social structure, is constructed around
wage labour and com m odity production. The history of m odem
times has been one of the relentless generalisation of the commodity
form across the globe and into everyday life. This m assive
in te rn a tio n a lisin g and u n iv e rsa lisin g trend has prod u ced
imperialism in its first and blindly brutal phases when it conquered
indigenous peoples and appropriated the resources o f the so-called
'New World'; later colonisation and labour migration from diverse
sources to consolidate its progress; and the internationalisation of
labour, capital and com m odities. These are not ju st matters of
structure, but profoundly matters of culture, which have tended to
make everyday life experience and expectations fundam entally
uniform: around the structure and culture of the commodity form.
But concom itant with this structural/cultural universalisation, the
integration of a growing proportion of the human population into
the material life, relations of class and desires of capitalism, has been
the dramatic a juxtaposition of differences. Not only have workers
of diverse background been throw n together and an imm ense
profusion of colourfully and culturally different commodities been
put on the market in metropolitan industrial societies, but states have
had to consider servicing the plurality and re-think some of the
fundamental tenets of assimilating nationalism. 'Multiculturalism' is
the response on the part of the liberal democratic state to manage
and service a diverse population. The use of ethnicity as a political
bargaining tool is also n e w /in essence, the goal is still structural
incorporation, but in a more sophisticated form so that difference
com fortably and respectably inhabits the private and the social
relations of the commodity are enhanced rather than confounded by
the necessary logistics of labour immigration.
The liberalism of multiculturalism is a very contradictory thing. It
is bom, not of traditionalisms which are characteristically illiberal
in the definition o f their boundaries, but of the cosmopolitanism and
individualism uniquely characteristic of late industrial societies.
Difference is fine. All that matters is the smooth reproduction of the
commodity form. Ethnic politics is even more complex: a rallying
point against racism and the structural marginalisation of minority
groups; reconstructed by the liberalism of the state as its own
rhetorical mission; then against both the initial radical impulse and
the state's liberal management, it becomes a means of conserving
supposedly primordial cultures, including their racism and sexism.
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The late industrial state and the culture of the commodity are equally
liberal when it com es to issues of gender. Certainly, the nuclear
fam ily and the 'family wage' are structures o f unequal gender
differentiation new to capitalism . But in the spread of the
com m odity even these are destroyed. More traditional domestic
functions are com m odified; the family wage is cut; and women
increasingly enter the w orkforce. In the high culture of this
liberalism are the Equal Employment Opportunity apparatchiki and
the professional 'Anglo'-feminists. Yet when this liberalism meets
ethnicity and multiculturalism, it finds itself in cultural conflict with
traditions which pay little respect to individual autonomy, economic
independence and gender equality. The same culture of liberalism,
on the other hand, is the basis of com petitive individualism, the
fragm entation of com munity and alienation in everyday life. The
liberal state in late industrial society, in order words, might in some
cases and in a totally contradictory and hypocritical way, be on the
way to becoming non-sexist as an integral part of the process of
extending the culture of the commodity.
Behind the double tendency of late industrialism to increasing
diversity alongside structural homogenisation, is the development of
a relativ ist philosophical fram ew ork around notions o f the
individual and difference. In everyday term s, this philosophy
translates into the following terms: W e are all unique individuals.
We are all different. Our differences are our own business and they
are o f equal value. You do your thing and I'll do mine. Anything is
possible in a world o f differences. You can choose what you want to
be. You can have your own culture. You, the individual, should
control your own destiny. You know what is right fo r you. Explore,
experiment, discover fo r yourself what you can be. Negotiate your
rights. L ook after y o u r s e lf' This is one of the m ost powerful
messages of the contemporary world. We are all formally equal in
our differences. Radical doubt and the self are all we are left with.
A sense of decentred existence comes from the rapidity of change,
the juxtaposition of differences, the maelstrom of modernity.
The 're-evaluation of all received values’, to use Nietsche's words, is
a fundam ental cultural phenom enon of our time. It is a world of
contradiction, in w hich there are both structures that bind and
radically open options. In pre-industrial societies, disintegrating
rem nants of which many of A ustralia's imm igrants left, one was
bora into fairly well-defined and durable social relations, of work,
womenhood or manhood. Now all this appears open. How does one
choose? W hat is the centre for judgment and decision-making? This
is the phenomenon of decentring.

13

Decentring is doubly difficult for immigrants from traditional rural
backgrounds. Despite the happy multicultural ideology of diversity,
tolerance, and cultural maintenance, dramatically new structures of
everyday life put pressure on traditional ways of seeing the world
and behaving in it. For men, there is often a loss of self-esteem as
their families become more independent and they are reduced to
child-like statues in menial factory work. There is also a loss of
authority because they are unfam iliar with the new ways of their
adopted homeland. The psychological effect can be devastating, with
profound implications for their wives, who often have to cope with
this as well as their own adjustment, and care for their children at
the same time.
For women, there is the double burden of paid work and domestic
work, in conditions that do not fulfil form er ideals of motherhood.
Financial independence is both liberating and perplexing, opening
options w hich destroy identifications that seem ed natural and
inevitable in childhood. Yet these same options of freedom involve
breaking with deep senses of community, and in the case of women,
family relations of care and responsibility.
For second generation im m igrants, the problem is even more
serious. The parents can retreat into the absolute moral maxims of
their past. They can explain their pain in relation to some
'knowable' loss. The past serves as an explanatory centre, from
which perspective they can lament their children's waywardness.
For the next generation this retreat is not so easy. With the rhetoric
of gender-role equality that is preached at school but hardly
realized in reality, contesting gender roles at home can appear futile
to girls, given the likely cost of being cut adrift and alienated from
their families. They become caught in the intersection of a double
racism - between being stereotyped as ethnic and morally backward
by the dom inant group, and their parents' hostility, to 'AngloA ustralian' cultural and m oral 'looseness.' Will they becom e
victims of assimilation or acquiescent dupes of traditionalism? The
conservative option is often taken as an attempt to ground their lives
in a decentred world. This is simultaneously an affirmation of what
is positive in traditional female roles, including deep senses of care
and community, and a recognition of what is personally fragmenting
and alienating in the world of choice and liberal individualism. In
m any ways, too, the dom inant culture of liberal m odernity,
including m uch career fem inism , is characteristically male and
unattractive: an indifference to feelings and care, a competitive
hardness, on exhausting self-centredness, a blind aggressiveness.
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So, the class-gender-ethnicity equation is not a sim ple one of
com pound oppressions w ith a clear solution in the form o f
liberation. A ffirm ation o f ethnicity is a tw o-edged sword: a
resistan ce to racism and d o m ination yet its e lf p o ten tially
conservative and racist. The ethic of liberal feminism is also a twoedged sw ord, liberatory yet b elo n g in g to the fragm ented,
individualistic, self-serving culture of industrialism. The structures
of social class and the world-historical process of the generalisation
of the commodity, on the other hand, delimit the politics of gender
and ethnicity and at the same tim e rem ain indifferent to their
outcomes so long as these do not threaten the system of wage labour
and commodity consumption.
W omen, Ethnicity and the State
Two critical and reforming sets o f politics have had a significant
impact on the state in the past few decades: the politics of gender and
the politics of ethnicity. Yet the two as argued so far in this chapter,
are by no means always compatible. Indeed, the two have mostly
been distant and reserved about each other's objectives. The impact
of the women's movement on the state, however far it still has to go,
has been significant. Women have achieved equal rights in matters
of divorce. They have gained equal pay, formally if not in practice.
There is anti-discrim ination and equal em ploym ent opportunity
legislation. There is paid m aternity leave. Institutionalised pre
school childcare is increasingly available. But the cultural
aspirations to economic and personal independence behind these
developm ents are characteristically m ore those o f m iddle-class,
E nglish speaking career w om en than n on-E nglish speaking
immigrant women. Or, at least, these women are not so strongly in
a position either within the home or in the broader context of their
relative social marginalisation, to avail themselves of the benefits of
these changes.
We need to keep in mind that in the new country the cultural and
social distance created by the lack of English and familiarity with
A ustralian traditions and institutions, and the dislocation from
hom eland culture as a result of migration, can com e together to
produce a situation of cultural segm entation for some groups of
non-English speaking background women, leaving them outside of
any dynam ic cultural movement around fem inist issues. The state
therefore for many non-English speaking background women is a
fore-runner o f feminist concerns in that it provides them with rights
and access to support fo r w hich their cultural background
experience does not prepare them. These seem to be there by magic
and not linked into the consciousness of the men and women of that
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group who have to negotiate receipt o f these rights or live in the
w orld w here others take them for granted. The m ulticultural
movement, on the other hand, developed in such a way that the
fundam ental welfare needs of non-English speaking background
women were neglected and a mostly male and conservative ethnic
community leadership was systematically incorporated. This needs
to be explained in historical terms.
The ideology of assimilation lasted in official rhetoric until the late
1960s, even if the terminology had shifted cosm etically towards
'integration' through the decade. By the early 1970s, however,
assim ilation was beginning not to work. Many imm igrants were
obviously staying culturally different. Specialist w elfare and
education needs were em erging as the settlem ent and welfare
'problem' became statistically bigger. There was a growing feeling
that a more sophisticated approach would be needed to stem the tide
of return m igration, principally to the 'econom ic m iracle' in
Europe. Finally, there was the emergence of 'ethnic' organisations
and, possibly, a 'migrant vote'.
A1 Grassby, Labor M inister for Immigration from 1972 to 1974 is
frequently credited, and with considerable justification, as being one
of the founding fathers of this multiculturalism. But there is also
important discontinuity which this historical conventional wisdom
ignores. Grassby's concern was not with difference, pluralism and
cultural diversity. It was for a unified 'family of the nation', rid of
forms of social injustice such as those suffered by many immigrants.
In fact, G rassby very rarely used the term 'm ulticultural' as
M inister for Im m igration. The fundam ental welfare reform ist
orientation o f Labor was to 'disadvantage' and lines of socio
economic division. Indeed, 'migrants' (a word to lose favour in the
era of Fraser/Galbally multiculturalism) were to be understood as a
subset o f the general class o f those disadvantaged so cio 
economically and discriminated against. Symptomatic of this policy
stance was the break-up of the Departm ent of Immigration into the
various 'm ainstream ' departm ents of labour, w elfare, education,
and so on. The problems of migrants were considered, at root, to be
general matters of social welfare and social justice.
Losing the elections o f 1972 and 1974, certain m em bers of the
Liberal Party began to consider that a decisive 'migrant vote' could
be possibly m obilised. Fraser, M ackellar and M acPhee were
particularly important in re-orienting Liberal policy. Their efforts
eventually came to fruition in the conservative government of the
late 1970s. The landmark in this process was the Galbally report of
1978 which became the basis of multicultural policy until the mid-
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1980s. Galbally multiculturalism , in sharp contrast to Grassby's
'family of the nation', was a clear, determined and extremely coste ffe c tiv e elem en t in the n e o -c o n s e rv a tiv e p ru n in g and
reconstruction of the welfare state. It was based on real cutbacks in
governm ent funding. In fact, it produced a reduction in overall
governm ent expenditure as its recom m endation (w hich was
accepted) that tax rebates for overseas dependants be abolished,
m ore than paid for the program s it set in m otion.G albally
m ulticulturalism involved shifting m igrant services from the
general rhetoric of social w elfare to m arginal 'ethnic specific’
services. This in part involved constructing 'ethnic' communities as
self-help w elfare agencies and giving them m inim al financial
support. It gave pow er to frequently conservative and male
dom inated 'community' leaderships. 'Ethnic Schools' and 'Grantsin-Aid' were typical of this approach.
Thus the shift in the language for reading cultural difference and
form ulating settlem ent and w elfare policy was from a unified
'family of the nation' to m ulticulturalism ; from disadvantage to
difference; from concern with general socio-econom ic issues in
w hich m igrants were included (a Laborist view of reform) to the
paradigm o f cultural difference in which cultural dissonance is the
main problem; from a social theory of class as the primary social
division to a social theory of multiple social divisions, none of which
have priority. Ethnic groups in the new m ulticulturalism were
im plicitly viewed, not as class-divided, but as hom ogeneous.
'Leaders' of ethnic groups could thus be viewed as 'representative',
and, at the same time, potentially vocal pressure groups could be
incorporated into the spirit of the state and given some responsibility
for their own 'community's' welfare provision.
This is not to say that there has not been significant progress:
E nglish language learning program s for children and adults;
'ethnic' radio and television; a telephone interpreter service;
specialist welfare services; a policy-oriented Office of Multicultural
Affairs in the Prime M inister's Department. This is the history that
in Australia has produced a dilemma for feminists and progressives
in general. Surely respect for the other, the underdog, the minority,
is in itself a progressive thing. Surely m ulticulturalism and its
apparent call for ethnic maintenance must be progressive. After all,
it is concerned with self-determination, tolerance and celebration
instead of denial of difference. So onto the bandwagon the state has
created they all hop. At the very least their welfare brief is enlarged.
But then it gets complicated. W hen you let 'them' speak, they say
things that make you uncomfortable.
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Two sites in which this is most clear at the moment are the Equal
E m ploym ent O pportunity and
education. The question of
participation in employment is a vexing one for the state given that
w om en are half the voting constituency and even in its own
institutions they are grossly under-represented at all the different
levels. It has tried to respond to the demands o f the organised
w om en's m ovem ent through its EEO structure. M ainstream
western industrialism, as it incorporates ethnic minorities or women
into its structures, for example, has to accommodate and service a
level of difference. Movement to a 'merit' principle of employment
and promotion partly enshrines this accommodation. Commonsense
working conceptions of merit of the past have not sat purely upon
the needs of industrialism, but have also included prejudices about
skin colour or gender. The dominant form of white, male merit is
buffeted by questions and struggles which prove the irrelevance,
injustice and unnecessariness of sexist and racist prejudices to the
essential structures of industrialism. Critically, these struggles gain
cogency (but also remain limited) because the m erit criterion is
itself culturally specific and structurally enduring. In other words,
one can be black or a woman and just as meritorious in terms of
systems needs and social effectiveness. The commonsense alliance of
w hite, male and m erit com es under fire w ithout fundam ental
criticism of the deeper cultural specificity of merit to industrialism.
So, the working conception of m erit changes as unnecessary
prejudices are removed, but m erit itself rem ains the constant,
fundam ental, structural requirem ent of industrialism : those
aptitudes and capacities that its sycophantic or critical operatives
require to be effective. This has involved limited transformation of
the concept of merit. Merit now should not prejudice differences. It
is about essential systems-requirements and not visible cultural or
physical differences which are, in fact, irrelevant to employment.
Skin colour and gender should not now prejudice one's merit for
employment.
But in every moment of respect for difference, even in moments of
celebration of difference and plurality, there is also a m om ent of
cultural incorporation. The cultures o f peasant agrarian villagers or
of domestic womanhood, for example, have no m erit in terms of
significant job promotion or intervention into mainstream pow er
structures. M erit becom es an ideal, perhaps even a form o f
liberation or a basis for cultural self-transformation, often not in
any articulate or explicit way, but through developing expectations
and struggling to learn the logistics o f social effectiveness.
Becoming meritorious is part of a process of cultural incorporation.
Intervention through education is another critical area where
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ethnicity meets the politics of gender. Here we have mandatory state
policies on m ulticulturalism and non-sexism . But they do not sit
easily together for all the reasons outlined above. In education, the
non-sexist policy to date has concerned itself mostly with addressing
girls about their options and taking affirmative action to enlarge the
choices made available to them. But, and this is o f particular
significance to girls of non-English speaking background whose
families still value traditional gender roles and aspirations, without
addressing the boys directly and focusing on their behaviour and
choices, the lives o f the girls can sim ply be made m uch more
difficult.
The question of focus is also a problem for m ulticulturalism . The
main response has been that if students' backgrounds are brought
within the discourse of the school, and if each group is immersed in
the d etails o f each other's difference, then tolerance and
understanding w ill em erge. The teachers are trained for this
exercise via suspect methods, as the following illustrates.
A sim ulation game about Greek marriage, devised and led by an
'A nglo'-A ustralian man was held at a training conference on
m ulticultural education for teachers and departmental consultants.
Variations of this approach can be found in the films, background
papers and teaching materials that have been created to represent
'the migrants'. The game went like this: It was announced by the
group leader that Greeks have arranged marriages - that this was
one feature of their culture and that the participants would play a
game that would simulate that experience. The players were asked to
choose their roles, whether to be male or female, young or old, their
status and so on. They were then supplied with rules with which to
arrange the dowries and the m arriage. The intention o f the game
w as to absorb tolerance by an im m ersion in G reekness: to
understand by feeling what it is like to be Greek.
Everyone played the game with much gusto and hilarity. But for all
concerned it was a misleading experience. First, the statem ent that
G reeks have arranged m arriages is d e-fa c to racist. A rranged
m arriages have nothing to do the 'G reekness' p e r se. People of
Maltese, Italian, Vietnamese and even English background (if one
remembers the marriage machinations of royalty with their feudal
lags) are, or have been, involved in them. Second, the players were
allow ed to choose their gender, status and age. M aybe there are
m iracles that can be achieved in our contem porary world, but
choosing to be male or female in a traditional Greek society was
pretty well impossible. That very elem ent o f choice distorted the
experience and allow ed for the fun. Third, arranged m arriages
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cannot be understood at the phenom enal level of their detail. In
traditional peasant societies that were subsistent and based on kin
working units, bringing any new person into the fold, with whom
you would now share the means of subsistence, was the whole
group's concern. A rranged m arriage was thus stru ctu rally
necessary for the reproduction and survival of that system. With it,
of course, developed all sorts of customs and mores, in particular
the necessity of virginity and its relationship to the exchange
contract. Now, in the process of migration out of the structures that
supported these practices, symbols and mores, to a society that is
based on independent income earning units and the culture of choice
and self-satisfaction through romance, it is difficult for the original
cultural practice to continue. The children can chose because they
can support them selves. Indeed they have to be form ally
independent and mobile.
Simulating the cultural practice in an ossified way without locating it
in historical context leads seemingly to two pedagogical options.
The first is to try and teach the children their parents' traditional
values and practices and encourage them to reproduce them as
valuable cultural forms. Or, in contrast, you can assert that in the
land of the brave and free, the child can choose to do anything . They
can chose to be free like every one else in Australia and make their
own decisions. One approach is ethnic maintenance. The other is
assimilation. O f course, neither is an unproblematic 'solution'. It is
not ju st a question of determ ination or determ ining. The two
processes are constantly in relation. But m ulticulturalism has not
seen its way out of this dilemma yet. And such is the confusion still
that one fears the project might be abandoned before anyone has had
a chance to reflect and modify their approach.
There is another way. It involves, not immersion in difference and
familiarity with phenomena, but the necessity to know the processes
involved in one's becoming when their origins are so diverse. It is a
peculiarly contemporary issue because of the way that pluralism is
generalised in all our experiences. It is not enough to know the
phenom ena, nor is it enough to have an understanding of some
driving structural imperative. They are not dislocated in the lives of
many people. The issues of gender and ethnicity emerged out of
m odernist struggles against patriarchy and im perialism s of all
kinds. But in some cases it appears that the difference that was
spawned and defended denies the modernist emancipatory direction
that gave it birth. So the state, which now imposes the modernist
social democratic victories, has also had to cater for difference. It
condones separatist Muslim schools that steer their girls in a very
traditional direction and Greek cultural associations whose main aim
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is to ensure intermarriage. We are left w ith a paradox, a paradox
that cannot be approached by mainstream fem inists simply asking
w om en of non-English speaking background to join in their game,
nor by viewing the state only within the logic of the dominant social
arrangem ents.
This chapter has attempted to portray the com plex relationship of
feminism to the politics of ethnic self-assertion. Rather than simply
assu m e th at c o u n te r-h e g e m o n ic p o litic s are n ec essarily
complementary, it has shown some important ways in which they
profoundly contradict each other's intentions. These contradictions
manifest themselves in real tensions and divisions, cracks which are
often papered over by the nice sounding class - gender - ethnicity
litany. On the one hand, mainstream institutional feminism is rooted
fundam entally in that liberal, libertarian culture of individual
freedom unique to late industrial societies. On the other hand, whilst
the politics o f ethnicity involves many fatally regressive and
quiescent elements, non-English speaking background women also
frequently live in a uniquely w om en's culture w hich is itself
counter-cultural to the dom inant ethos o f conventional success in
late industrial society. Dialogue between the m ainstream feminist
m ovem ent and non-English speaking background women would
fruitfully open m uch fem inism to critical scrutiny for its own
cultural and historical role and at the same time open the lives of
m any non-English speaking background w om en to the positive
things in the culture of liberal industrialism , w ithout losing the
profound sense of the social they have brought from cultural settings
not so far down the track of industrialism . The solution to the
com plexity and contradiction is not vive la difference. It is critical
dialogue and the forging o f a new culture, beyond nostalgic
traditionalism s and beyond the liberal m odernity of the culture of
the commodity.
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